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INTRODUCTION
Well my glove compartment is locked, so is the trunk in the back, and I know my rights
so you goin’ need a warrant for that.
. . . sung in faux colloquy . . .
Aren’t you sharp as a tack? You some type of lawyer or something? Somebody
important or something?

Jay-Z, 99 Problems
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Here you have this guy who’s in the car and he has, you know, drugs on him. And he’s
all the way in the wrong. And he’s going on the highway. And here you have this cop
who’s on the turnpike and he pulls the car over–not because they have drugs in the car,
but because the driver is Black, which happened a lot.

Jay-Z in a 2010 interview at the New York Public Library 1
Twenty years ago, according to hip-hop folklore, Jay-Z played with
lyrics that would become the song 99 Problems—a hit on his 2004 Black
Album that became one of the defining tracks of the era. Combining a hook
taken from Ice-T’s single of the same name 2 with an entertaining and
apocryphal account of a traffic stop, Jay-Z masterfully mixes tension, humor,
and the kind of contemporary societal critique he would expand upon
throughout The Blueprint. 3
Many songs discuss or recount encounters with the law—far too many
to discuss comprehensively in a single article. But among these, 99 Problems
stands out. In just five minutes, the artist discusses multiple criminal
procedural issues of varying complexity, all with impressive precision. And
the song’s “educational” effect on the population should not be
underestimated: 99 Problems enjoyed a positive reception among a diverse
audience of millions of people, including a generation of young Black men—
a group more likely than others to encounter the police under adversarial
conditions. Recognizing this, the article follows the chronology of the song’s
events, discussing each of the multiple criminal procedural issues the artist
adeptly describes with reference to the relevant case law.
I. SETTING THE STAGE: OUR APOCRYPHAL PROTAGONIST’S PREDICAMENT
The song’s central storyline occurs in 1994 while the protagonist is
driving at highway speeds with contraband in the trunk compartment of his
vehicle and begins when an officer in a trailing police vehicle initiates a

1
Jay-Z Decodes 99 Problems, New York Public Library Nov. 15, 2010),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fSP7cY2uzPY [https://perma.cc/9PNZ-5RD3].
2
99 Problems appears on Ice-T’s album Home Invasion (Priority Records 1993). Aside
from this observation, throughout this Article 99 Problems refers to the Jay-Z track. Jay-Z is
the stage name of Shawn C. Carter, who holds copyrights and other rights to the music being
discussed under his legal name; the names Jay-Z and Shawn C. Carter are used
interchangeably in footnotes to correctly portray the legal rights involved, but Jay-Z is used in
the body text of the Article for brevity and due to reader familiarity with this individual’s stage
name.
3
The Blueprint refers both to an eponymous 2001 studio album and the lineage of albums
and tours that followed.
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traffic stop. 4 Though the narrator considers fleeing the encounter, he thinks
better of it. He pulls his vehicle to the side of the road—in part citing his
pecuniary capacity 5 to hire counsel if he is arrested. Had he fled, the song
would offer a very different criminal procedure lesson, and there would be
no nuance as to the vulnerability of our protagonist’s trunk to a police search
under King, one of the most important cases in recent years that discusses the
scope and use of the so-called “hot-pursuit” exception, historically known as
the “exigent circumstances” exception.6
When the officer commences the traffic stop inquiry in a typical
manner 7 by asking whether our narrator-motorist knows of the reason for the
Terry stop, the motorist alleges racism or racial profiling may be among the
motives for the interruption of his otherwise-innocuous highway travels. 8
4
“The year’s [19]94, in my trunk is raw; in my rearview mirror is the motherfuckin’ law.”
Shawn C. Carter, 99 Problems, on The Black Album (Roc-A-Fella Records and Def Jam
Recordings 2004).
5
“I got a few dollars, I can fight the case.” Id. For a discussion of what happens to
defendants who don’t “got a few dollars” to fight a case, see generally Shaun Ossei-Owusu,
The Sixth Amendment Façade: The Racial Evolution of the Right to Counsel, 167 U. PA. L.
REV. 1161, 1178–82 (2018) (discussing evolution of legal aid movement to help defendants
without requisite pecuniary resources); see also Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas,
Triaging Appointed-Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967,
974–76 (2012); Julian A. Cook, III, Federal Guilty Pleas: Inequities, Indigence, and the Rule
11 Process, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1073, 1091–99 (2019) (discussing Lee v. United States and Class
v. United States in detail and emphasizing importance of assistance of able counsel at trial and
in preparation for appeal).
6
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 455 (2011) (Alito, J. writing as part of an eight-justice
majority) (“It is well established that ‘exigent circumstances,’ including the need to prevent
the destruction of evidence, permit police officers to conduct an otherwise permissible search
without first obtaining a warrant.”).
7
“‘Son, do you know why I’m stopping you for?’” Carter, supra note 4.
8
“‘Cause I’m young and I’m black and my hat’s real low . . .’” Id. “A policeman who
concentrates a disproportionate amount of his limited time and resources on young black men
is going to uncover far more crimes—and therefore be far more successful in his career[.]”
John Derbyshire, The Case For Racial Profiling, JOHN DERBYSHIRE (February 19, 2001),
https://johnderbyshire.com/Opinions/Culture/racialprofiling.html; accord Jackson Toby,
Racial Profiling Doesn’t Prove Cops Are Racist, WALL ST. J. at A22 (Mar. 11, 1999)
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB921110326632114685 [https://perma.cc/E2EU-PANL]. For
contextual discussion of racial profiling in traffic stops, see Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y.
Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 651, 687–89, 721–29 (2002); GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 140–41
(Harvard 1996) (economics discusses taste-based discrimination in race, as opposed to
statistical discrimination, as preference on basis of race itself rather than result correlated with
race statistically); see generally J. Guryan & K.K. Charles, Taste Based or Statistical
Discrimination: The Economics of Discrimination Returns to its Roots, 123 ECON. J. 417–
(2013) (discussing lineage of law-and-economics discrimination research beginning with
Becker’s book, The Economics of Discrimination, in 1957).
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Indeed, recent empirical research suggests this may be the case: in a largescale analysis of over 100,000,000 traffic stops, researchers 9 exploited the
known time of sunset in various jurisdictions 10 and analyzed the
demographics of motorists stopped by police. Unsurprisingly, Pierson et al.
found that non-white drivers are stopped more often during hours of the day
when their race is more easily detected from a distance.
The song suggests there are drugs detectable by a canine search 11 in the
protagonist’s trunk. To understand the context for this, the listener must
appreciate changes in the regulatory climate and actions of state legislatures
since 1994. We now enjoy access to data that did not exist in 1994 (when the
song’s events occur) or in 2004 (when the song was released) as to the effects
of marijuana legalization on police behavior during Terry stops. In 2012, with
the legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado and Washington,
searches of vehicles driven by motorists of all studied racial groups decreased
meaningfully in those states. 12 This suggests that stops, like the one described
in the song, will generally reduce as marijuana legalization grows in

9

See Emma Pierson, Camelia Simoiu, Jan Overgoor, Sam Corbett-Davies, Daniel Jenson,
Amy Shoemaker, Vignes Ramachandran, Phoebe Barghouty, Cheryl Phillips, Ravi Schroff,
& Sharad Goel, A Large-Scale Analysis of Racial Disparities in Police Stops Across the United
States, STANFORD COMPUTATIONAL POLICY LAB (Mar. 13, 2019) on file with the author at
karlmuth.com/100M-stops.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BGG-TM4Y]. For context and an excellent
discussion of earlier research, see generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES,
AND STEREOTYPES (Harvard 2003) (providing then state-of-the-art analysis of available data
on alignment of behavior and stereotypes in relevant contexts).
10
It is meaningfully harder to identify the race of a motorist from a distance after dark.
See Jeffrey Grogger & Greg Ridgeway, Testing for Racial Profiling in Traffic Stops From
Behind a Veil of Darkness, 101 J. AM. STAT. ASSOC. 878 (2006) (asserting veil-of-darkness
allows observation of daytime racial bias in traffic stops and comparisons to nighttime
conditions with reduced bias). But see Jesse Kalinowski, Stephen L. Ross, & Matthew B. Ross,
Endogenous Driving Behavior in Tests of Racial Profiling in Police Traffic Stops, HCEO
WORKING PAPERS SERIES (2017), available at http://humcap.uchicago.edu/RePEc/hka/w
paper/Kalinowski_Ross_Ross_2017_driving-veil-darkness_v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/V26T-R
QWA] (questioning whether exploiting veil-of-darkness conditions creates bias in resulting
research).
11
Jay-Z’s music often features fictional protagonists carrying firearms or narcotics who
are subject to imminent risk of arrest. These characters are sometimes presented in a semiautobiographical guise, as in I.Z.Z.O. where the narrator is holding crack cocaine in his hand
within sight of police officers: “Why I got my hand closed? Crack’s in my palm, watchin’ the
long arm o’ the law.” Shawn C. Carter, I.Z.Z.O., on The Blueprint (Roc-A-Fella Records and
Def Jam Recordings 2001).
12
Pierson, Simoiu, Overgoor, Corbett-Davies, Jenson, Shoemaker, Ramachandran,
Barghouty, Phillips, Schroff, & Goel, supra note 9, at 8.
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popularity and footprint 13 in the United States and federal reform looks
possible. 14 This research also raises the exciting prospect of reducing
discriminatory behavior by police hoping to find and seize marijuana in
Black motorists’ vehicles.
Despite this positive potential collateral effect of reduced arbitrary
searches of Black defendants from marijuana legalization, the current state is
grim. In work that generalizes an earlier model 15 and examines data from the
Boston Police Department, 16 Kate Antonovics and Brian Knight observe that
in a scenario where the decision of an officer to search a motorist’s vehicle
is independent of race, or statistical rather than preference-based, then the
searches should occur independent of the officer’s race. But instead,
Antonovics and Knight find officers are far more likely 17 to search the
vehicle of a motorist whose racial identity differs from the officer’s racial
identity.

13

In June of 2019, Illinois legalized recreational marijuana use effective January 1, 2020.
See A Bill Regarding Cannabis Legalization I.L.G.A. HB0902 (2019) and 720 ILCS 130, 301,
550, and 600 et seq. and as amended (most recently amended in June and November of 2019).
14
See Paul Larkin Jr., The Proper Way to Reconsider Federal Marijuana Policy, The
Heritage Foundation (2018). Available at https://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/report/
the-proper-way-reconsider-federal-marijuana-policy [https://perma.cc/24DQ-Z6WU] (last
accessed April 22, 2020).
15
For additional methodological context, see John Knowles, Nicola Persico, & Petra
Todd, Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence, 109 J. POL. ECON. 203,
221–25 (2001).
16
Kate Antonovics & Brian G. Knight, A New Look at Racial Profiling: Evidence from
the Boston Police Department, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 163, 169–72 (2009). The introduction
of body cameras and other technologies in the decade since the Antonovics & Knight article
has not substantially changed police behavior, unfortunately; for a discussion of why recording
the police may be helpful evidence but not curative of misbehavior, see generally Karl T. Muth
& Nancy Jack, Watching Watchers: Monitoring Police Performance as Public Servants, 73
NAT’L L. GUILD REV. 23, 25 (2016) (arguing observing police officers’ misconduct is separate
and distinct from ensuring officers receive discipline).
17
Antonovics & Knight, supra note 16, at 170–72.
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Illustration by Becca Bowlin of joandeart.com and used with permission.

II. “DOING 55 IN A 54”: TERRY V. OHIO AND ITS EXTENDED FAMILY
The justification for the Terry stop 18 in 99 Problems stems from an
alleged speed limit violation, though the narrator suggests this is a pretense 19
for further investigation of the vehicle, its occupant, and its contents. Simple
curiosity about whether the narrator is a licensed driver or has a registered
18

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Cf. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (Fourth Amendment
does not require informing suspects they are free to go prior to obtaining permission for
vehicle search), notably two years after the year of the portrayed incident; see also United
States v. Laymon, 730 F. Supp 332, 339 (D. Colo. 1990) (traffic stop based on defendant’s
driving was a pretext for an impermissible stop primarily based on defendant’s race and
origin). Contra Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 818–19 (1996) (Scalia, J., unanimous
decision) (any infraction, however minor, represents a valid reason for initiating Terry stop).
19
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vehicle, 20 or suspicion from afar that a young Black man might be armed, 21
or suspicion that the motorist may be traveling an unusually long distance,
all constitute insufficient cause to stop a vehicle, let alone search it. 22
Once the vehicle is stopped, the officer questions the narrator. 23
Embarking on a “fishing expedition,” 24 the officer asks the motorist, “Well,
do you mind if I look around the car a little bit?”
The motorist replies that the glovebox and trunk are locked 25 and that
he will not consent 26 to a warrantless search of either. 27 A locked
compartment does not itself create sufficient reasonable suspicion 28 and it
would be unreasonable for an officer to contend the glovebox might hold an

“‘License and registration and step out of the car.’” Carter, supra note 4.
“‘Are you carrying a weapon on you? I know a lot of you are.’” Id.
22
See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (stopping motorists merely to check
they are licensed drivers or to examine their vehicle registrations constitutes a Fourth
Amendment violation); see also United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 1971)
(finding search not reasonable when based upon “a generalized suspicion that any black person
driving an auto with out-of-state license plates might be engaged in criminal activity”); cf.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (holding Fourth Amendment does
not allow law enforcement officers driving around and stopping vehicles on highways to
determine if occupants are of Mexican ancestry or are illegal aliens).
23
Carter, supra note 4.
24
This phrase is purposefully chosen by the author as an allusion to Robinette, 519 U.S.
at 41 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
25
“Well, my glove compartment is locked, so is the trunk in the back, and I know my
rights so you gon’ need a warrant for that.” Carter, supra note 4.
26
Though the narrator does not explicitly say “I do not consent,” his demand for a warrant
is a non-consent to a warrantless search. Id. As to this proposition of law, see generally Florida
v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) (standard in evaluating consent is “what would the typical
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect”). See
also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 183, 189 (1990). A person’s non-consent or failure to
cooperate with an officer is not by itself suspicious. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437
(1991); see also Rachel Karen Laser, Unreasonable Suspicion: Relying on Refusals to Support
Terry Stops, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1178–79 (1995) (asserting the value of the right to refuse
a search in a Terry context is compromised “if the exercise of that right can be used against a
person” in later proceedings).
27
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 189; Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 143–147 (1925)
(matter at bar involving bootleg alcohol being smuggled in automobile).
28
See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 454–465, 468–471 (1981) (Stewart, J. for sixJustice majority establishes bright-line rule to replace earlier case-by-case determination;
Rehnquist, J. concurring and exploring relationship to Mapp v. Ohio explicitly); accord United
States v. Tavolacci, 895 F.2d 1423, 1425–26 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (as to locked piece of luggage).
But see United States v. Valiant, 873 F.2d 205, 206 (8th Cir. 1989) (as to locked briefcase);
United States v. Gonzales, 71 F.3d 819, 820–22 (11th Cir. 1996) (as to glovebox).
20
21

8

JCLC ONLINE

[Vol. 111

easily-accessible pistol or something else posing a danger to the officer. 29
Nor is it reasonable to believe the motorist, or anything in his area or
possession, poses an imminent danger to the officer. 30 Yet the threshold is
the boundary of the vehicle; once a search of the vehicle becomes reasonable,
a search of its contents also becomes reasonable. This is a distinction without
a difference, 31 so our protagonist must hold the boundary of the police
officer’s inquiry to the exterior of his vehicle.
Before analyzing the police officer’s behavior, however, one must stop
to focus on perhaps the most important lyric in the song from a criminal
procedure standpoint, which happens in the first volley of dialogue between
the narrator and the officer: “Am I under arrest?”
III. FREE TO LEAVE?
“Am I under arrest?” and its cousin, “Am I free to leave?”32 are staples
of criminal procedure fact patterns in law school classrooms and on bar
examinations. They are magic words and force a binary reply from the state;
in this case, the officer conducting the Terry stop. 33 Posing the question
29
See generally Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1035–37 (1983) (O’Connor, J.) (facts
in Long involved motorist David Long transporting illegal marijuana across Michigan); see
also Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335–36 (2009) (defendant standing outside vehicle cannot
reasonably access weapons or destroy evidence inside vehicle).
30
Gant, 556 U.S. at 335–36; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
31
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 799–803 (1982) (finding search of vehicle’s
contents indistinguishable from search of vehicle). See also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S.
565, 568–69 (1991) (stating if there is probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of an
automobile, then probable cause also exists to search that vehicle’s contents).
32
For a novel experiment in the free-to-leave doctrine, see David K. Kessler, Free to
Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth Amendment’s Seizure Standard, 99 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 51, 51–52 (2009) (406 Boston residents asked whether they feel they are free
to leave under test conditions designed to simulate Fourth Amendment jurisprudential
narratives).
33
Though primarily discussed in the context of contact between officers and motorists in
the modern world, Terry did not involve a traffic stop in the modern sense. Rather, it involved
a pedestrian armed with two revolvers and ammunition. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 2. From Terry
descend two important lineages of criminal procedure, one having to do with the practice of
questioning motorists on the roadside and one having to do with stop-and-frisk investigations
of pedestrians by the police, something utilized aggressively in then-Mayor Bloomberg’s New
York City. In fact, the description of stop-and-frisk codified in New York seems tailored by a
legislator freshly acquainted with Terry. Compare N.Y. CRIM. PRO. L. § 140.50 (McKinney
2010) with Terry, 392 U.S. at 16–30. In Terry, Chief Justice Warren describes what would
become the skeleton upon which the last nearly-sixty years of police interaction with the
citizenry depends. For a description of Terry in more depth, inclusive of its substantial
modification by the cases discussed herein and its clarification by Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial
District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 179–182 (2004), which is not relevant here (but would
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directly to the officer eliminates the Mendenhall calculus 34 and transforms a
cumulative analysis, on which reasonable people might differ, into a
deterministic outcome. Without the question, Mendenhall dictates a totality
of the circumstances test that determines whether a defendant is in custody
or free to leave, something difficult to examine in hindsight, even with the
benefit of today’s body cameras 35 or similar contemporarily created accounts
of the circumstances.
Once the analysis escapes the orbit of the totality-of-the-circumstances
calculus in Mendenhall, however, the path of inquiry does not end. While
that analysis governs whether the subject of the investigation may leave, it
does not dictate whether that person is subject to arrest. By posing the
question, Jay-Z’s protagonist engages in a well-timed and savvy gambit: he
suspects the officer has not yet developed probable cause to effect an arrest. 36
And the Court has said on more than one occasion, most recently in Vernonia,
that suspicion alone is not enough for an arrest, 37 even if the officer’s training
provides a basis for heightened suspicion under these circumstances. 38
Thus, once the question is posed, there are two possible outcomes:
“You are under arrest.”
The defendant motorist is “seized” under the Fourth Amendment. 39 The
defendant enjoys, and should be informed of, the rights of an arrestee.
“You are free to leave.”

be if Jay-Z’s protagonist resisted producing his license and registration), the Author
recommends the reference treatise popular among criminal law practitioners WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 117–22
(Thomson/West 5th ed. 2012).
34
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 547 (1980) (introducing totality of
circumstances test as to whether person in question was free to leave).
35
Muth & Jack, supra note 16, at 27–29.
36
“The police may not arrest upon mere suspicion but only on ‘probable cause.’” Mallory
v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957).
37
Individualized suspicion and probable cause are used interchangeably by the modern
Court, but this is meaningfully different from the “general” or colloquial suspicion being
discussed here. For the distinction between individual and general suspicion, see Vernonia
School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 678 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
individualized suspicion requirement has a legal pedigree as old as the Fourth Amendment
itself.”). For distinctions and relevant nuance of usage, see, for example, Wyoming v.
Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 311–13 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38
See generally United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419 (1981) (officer cannot rely
upon his or her training to manufacture or enhance suspicion where none would otherwise
adhere to that particular scenario).
39
The initial Terry stop is also a seizure, albeit a seizure of special and limited scope,
“even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief.”
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
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The defendant motorist is not “seized” under the Fourth Amendment.
The defendant motorist can depart immediately.
It seems, at the time the question is posed and with the limited facts
available, that the narrator is free to leave. The officer does not reply that he
is under arrest or that he cannot depart and continue on his way. Moreover,
the officer has not developed reasonable suspicion to introduce a canine
search to the scenario. Absent “reasonable suspicion,” police extension of a
routine traffic stop to conduct the procedure colloquially known as a “dog
sniff” violates the Fourth Amendment. 40 An officer’s suspicion is not
reasonable if derived simply from his or her own training 41 or from intuition
and vague hunches. 42
Further, the traffic stop has likely reached its natural conclusion, with
the officer having confirmed the motorist-narrator is a licensed driver with
valid registration. If a police cruiser was so equipped in 1994, the police
officer might have used a computer or radio to check for warrants or review
stolen vehicle records. These are valid activities that may occur in a traffic
stop without unduly delaying or burdening the motorist. 43 There is no
mention made of whether a citation for speeding was issued, but if so, this
can be effected promptly. Delaying the narrator’s further travel while a
canine unit arrives is unreasonable under current law.
Though nuanced differences exist between the Circuit Courts of Appeal,
the Sixth Circuit is representative in doctrine and eloquent in its recent
descriptions of law. Like many of its sibling Circuit Courts of Appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit appreciates that
perpetually curious officers may prolong traffic stops until all of their
suspicions, no matter how unreasonable, are exhausted. This is burdensome
and intrusive from the motorist’s perspective and creates an unreasonable
roadside seizure of the person and his or her only mode of transport. Delaying
the writing of a ticket for a trivial offense does not acceptably or lawfully
prolong a roadside Terry stop. 44 Nor does an officer’s “feeling” that a
motorist is nervous or a “perception” that answers to the officer’s questions
were “confusing” or contradictory transform an unacceptable roadside

40

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 353 (2015) (police may not “extend an
otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion, in order to conduct a dog
sniff”); “Well we’ll see how smart you are when the K-9 come.” Carter, supra note 4.
41
See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 411–12.
42
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989).
43
See Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 648–50; see also United States v. Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345,
1349 (10th Cir. 1998).
44
See United States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651, 661–62 (6th Cir. 2012).
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detention into an acceptable one. 45 Being nervous, being of a particular ethnic
group, or “traveling light” do not form a basis for detaining an otherwiseunremarkable motorist. 46 But this lineage of case law, the beneficiary of
clarity in Rodriguez, 47 was importantly and appreciably murkier in 1994
when Jay-Z’s narrator encounters the police officer.
IV. RELEVANT CASE LAW SINCE 1994
At the time of the search in 99 Problems, Place 48 represented the law
regarding dog sniffs in the United States. It is unclear whether the song was
written with Illinois v. Caballes 49 in mind, but setting the song in 1995 with
the benefit of Caballes and without Rodriguez would have created a less
ambiguous situation (albeit not in the narrator’s favor). Indeed, some lower
courts have penned decisions seen as increasingly motorist-friendly in the
years since the fictional Terry stop in 99 Problems. 50 Most motorist-friendly
among these is State v. Carty, and its accord cousins in other state courts of
appeal, holding that the officer must have an articulable suspicion before
asking to search a vehicle; however, no United States Court of Appeals has
not held this in any case.
In 1994, officers felt empowered both to stop motorists and to use dogs.
The then-recently decided Sitz case (1990) 51 seemingly endorsed a broader
Terry stop framework and an expansion of officers’ roadside authority. The
nineties were a time of shifting views and shifting policy priorities, especially
regarding drug enforcement. Drug enforcement policies revealed
increasingly disparate socioeconomic and racial impacts and resulted in a
swelling of the nonviolent offender prison population during the Clinton
45

United States v. Richardson, 385 F.3d 625, 630–31 (6th Cir. 2004).
See, e.g., United States v. Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367, 1371 (11th Cir. 1990).
47
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 351–53 (2015).
48
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 698–99 (1983) (O’Connor, J.) (discussing cocaine
found by dog at LaGuardia Airport). The Court has remarked it is these “hair-splitting
distinctions” that decide cases. See, e.g., Quarles v. New York, 467 U.S. 649, 664 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
49
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–10 (2005) (Stevens, J.) (introduction of canine
unit in traffic stop where stop is not unreasonably prolonged does not violate rights of Terrystop-detained motorist).
50
In State v. Carty, 790 A.2d 903, 905 (N.J. 2002), the New Jersey Supreme Court held
an officer must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion before even asking to search a vehicle
in the scenario the song describes. See also State v. Quino, 840 P.2d 358 (Haw. 1992). But see
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
51
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1990) (upholding sobriety
checkpoints wherein every motorist is briefly seized for purposes of diagnostic conversations
designed to detect inebriation); see generally United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
548–50 (1976) (upholding similar checkpoint for immigration purposes).
46
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administration. 52 These changes culminated in Justice O’Connor’s opinion in
Edmond, 53 holding that it was unreasonable to detain motorists even for a
short period for what was a general investigation of crime. Justice
O’Connor’s reasoning, durable enough to be used again by the Court in
Caballes, 54 shifted the focus from the investigation’s method to the
inconvenience that investigation causes the motorist.
As for dogs, police felt in 1994, in part by virtue of Place, that use of
dogs constituted a special “non-search search.” Instead, they offered a mode
of investigative inquiry that was dispositive without being intrusive. Under
the doctrine in Place, a sniff is not a search. Because of a dog’s unique and
extraordinary olfactory abilities, the Court reasoned in Justice O’Connor’s
Place opinion, a dog can determine a parcel’s contents without opening it.
By allowing this non-search search, O’Connor’s opinion created a loophole
for inquisitive police behavior outside the traditional Fourth Amendment
construct and (perhaps) outside Terry’s traditional ambit.55
The narrowing—or more optimistically, the increased precision—of the
Place matter is important. At trial, Place challenged the canine search and
moved to suppress the discovered cocaine 56 as the fruit of an impermissible
search. The Second Circuit, noticing the challenge of the search had been
properly preserved for appeal, reversed. 57 That court found the duration and
circumstances of the search to be pertinent and dog’s sniff to be necessary,
however unobtrusive and impermissible (primarily on the duration or burden
of the investigation of Place’s luggage). The matter was escalated.58

52

While the 1994 crime bill was meant to “break the cycle of drugs and crime,” it actually
amplified this cycle’s speed, by incarcerating an enormous number of non-white men and then
ensuring they would not have legal job prospects once released; worse, police departments
rewarded their officers for this wave of detentions, arrests, and “tough on crime” outcomes,
again increasing the prevalence of harassment of Black motorists by police officers and, not
unrelatedly, accelerating the cycle of Black incarceration in America. Compare U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE REPORT ON THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION’S LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY (1999),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/dag/pubdoc/Drug_Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4LWTY9DK] with H.R. 3355 VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994
(104th Congress) (1994) codified by Pub. L. 103-322 (1994).
53
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35–37 (2000).
54
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408–10.
55
See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354–58 (2015). Justice Ginsburg
discusses this problem throughout Rodriguez.
56
United States v. Place, 498 F. Supp. 1217 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (motion to suppress cocaine
denied).
57
United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 46–50 (2d Cir. 1981).
58
See United States v. Place, 457 U.S. 1104 (1982) (cert. granted).
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Under Place, 59 asking a defendant to endure a 90-minute delay for a dog
sniff investigation to occur is unreasonable. However, it is the delay (and
seizure of the defendant and his or her effects during the delay) that creates
the unreasonableness under O’Connor’s opinion, and not the sniffing itself–
accord Caballes years later. In fact, the sniffing is not even a “search” in the
Fourth Amendment context and does not trigger heightened scrutiny of the
type afforded to officers rummaging through a defendant’s belongings or
similar, more invasive investigative activities. 60
If 99 Problems contains a legal message, it is that Place and its lineage
of thought created an exception to the prior Fourth Amendment framework
that was ripe for exploitation and abuse. A dog may be special, and may even
be unique (sui generis), but to place it outside the search-and-seizure
framework that benefits from centuries of jurisprudence is several steps too
far. The song 99 Problems uses unexceptional circumstances to illustrate the
folly of this exception.

59

See generally United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983) and its lineage.
Justice Brennan, concurring, observed that dogs are not binary indicators and can reveal
more than the mere presence or absence of narcotics. Place, 462 U.S. at 710 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the result). Justice Blackmun, concurring separately and substantively in
parallel, noted it was not necessary to decide whether a dog sniff was a search, as the seizure
of the luggage was unreasonable. Id. at 721 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgement). In the
wake of Illinois v. Caballes, however, the scope-of-inquiry analysis is replaced with a
reasonableness-of-duration analysis; in other words, the dog may “search” as much as it likes
because its “search is not a search” but it may not “search” for as long as it wants. See
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 405–09, noting also Justice Stevens’ citation to Place and the sui generis
doctrine surrounding dog sniffs.
60
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Illustration by Becca Bowlin of joandeart.com and used with permission.

V. ARRAIGNMENT, PRETRIAL HEARING, AND BOND DISPARITIES
The listener is spared the intervening indignities of the canine search
and the narrator’s arrest. What the listener hears instead is echoes of the
process: the arresting officer’s imagined bragging to his boss, 61 the narrator’s
being sent to a holding cell, 62 and the narrator’s journey from there to a
courtroom. 63
The narrator alludes to the significant disparities in how Black
defendants are treated in pretrial hearings and the fact that judges often enjoy
61

“He and his boys gonna be yappin’ to the Captain.” Carter, supra note 4.
“And there I go trapped in the Kit-Kat again, back through the system with the riff-raff
again.” Id.
63
“Paparazzi with they cameras, snappin’ em.” Id.
62
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wide latitude in determining bond amounts in ways that are not outcome or
impact-neutral from a race standpoint. 64 Specifically, because of the
substantial average wealth gap between Black and non-Black individuals, a
similar money bond amount may cause the pretrial incarceration of the Black
individual, while his non-Black counterpart can await trial from the comfort
of his home. 65 In recent groundbreaking research, Damon Jones and
colleagues at the University of Chicago66 examine JP Morgan Chase & Co.
data combined with voter registration data 67 to show that Black households
have a lower wealth (asset) base than other racial groups.
When one combines this lower wealth in Black households with the
measurably disparate treatment of Black and other non-white defendants in
bond hearings in jurisdictions that still utilize money bond, it’s easy to see
why the “same bond for the same crime” doctrine may not result in equitable
treatment of pretrial defendants. Indeed, defendants have challenged money
bail systems on both due process and equal protection grounds with varying
degrees of success. 68 Some jurisdictions have, in part due to equity concerns,
made the release of an accused person on an unsecured bond the default
outcome of their pretrial hearing mechanisms. 69
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri summarized
the excess bail argument this way: “[N]o person may, consistent with the
64
Id.; see generally MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH / WHITE
WEALTH 39–42, 174–80 (2dd. 2006) (discussing disparate treatment of Black individuals by
courts).
65
See Francine D. Blau & John W. Graham, Black-White Differences in Wealth and Asset
Composition, 421 Q.J. ECON. 321–39 (1990); see also Edward N. Wolff, Household Wealth
Trends in the United States, 1962-2013: What Happened over the Great Recession? (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20733, 2014), https://www.nber.org/
papers/w20733.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BUU-ML7B].
66
Working with collaborators and datasets provided by JP Morgan Chase & Co., see Peter
Ganong, Damon Jones, Pascal Noel, Diana Farrell, Fiona Greig, and Chris Wheat, Wealth,
Race, and Consumption Smoothing of Typical Income Shocks (Draft Working Paper current
version: April 21, 2020), https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/voices.uchicago.edu/dist/b/1275/
files/2020/04/2020-04-20_race_cons_smoothing.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF8Z-4AFY]. See
also cf. Peter Ganong & Pascal Noel, Consumer Spending During Unemployment (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25417, 2019), https://www.nber.org/papers
/w25417 [https://perma.cc/JKP5-Y8BX].
67
Voter registration data in the jurisdictions involved reveal the race of the voterregistrant.
68
See generally Timothy C. Evans, “General Order No. 18.8A – Procedures for Bail
Hearings and Pretrial Release” (July 17, 2017).
69
Accord Jones v. City of Clanton etiam sciri Varden v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15-cv-34MHT, 2015 WL 5387219 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015) (plaintiff arrested and jailed on
misdemeanor charges but could not produce the municipality’s required $500 bond per
charge).
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Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, be held in custody after an arrest because the person is too poor
to post a monetary bond.” 70 The matter in question involved a 26-year-old
female motorist cited for having a nonfunctioning headlight who argued she
could not provide for her two young children if she posted bond; such tradeoffs indicate our society’s endemic wealth disparities, which exacerbate the
poor treatment of Black defendants in our system even in the earliest stages
of a case’s trajectory. 71
But Jay-Z’s “half a mil’ for bail ‘cause I’m African” 72 fails to
comprehensively describe the disadvantages young Black men like the
song’s narrator face in the American criminal justice system. This disparity
in treatment of defendants continues throughout the process of a criminal
matter, a fact that is both well-studied and well-documented. 73 Statistically,
Black defendants are not only more likely to be searched 74 and held on bond
(and comparatively high bond, 75 particularly relative to their household
wealth or access to liquid capital), but Black defendants are also more likely
to face serious charges, 76 more likely to be convicted, 77 and more likely to be
incarcerated 78 as a result of that conviction.

70

Pierce v. City of Velda City, No. 4:15-cv-00570-HEA, 2015 WL 10013006 (E.D. Mo.
June 3, 2015) (appended materials, Settlement Agreement at *1); see also MISSOURI SUPREME
COURT RULE 37.15(a) and MISSOURI LOCAL RULE E44-457 codified as RULES § 544.457
(applies specifically to municipal courts and their proceedings) (2017, 2019, and as amended).
71
Pierce, 2015 WL 10013006 at *1; see also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
307–08 (1880) (considering participation in justice system by Black people in context of jury
service and more broadly).
72
Carter, supra note 4.
73
Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, The Numbers Don’t Speak for Themselves:
Racial Disparities and the Persistence of Inequality in the Criminal Justice System, 27
CURRENT DIR. IN PSYCH. SCI. 183, 183–87 (2018).
74
See generally Sharad Goel, Justin M. Rao, and Ravi Schroff, Precinct or Prejudice?
Understanding Racial Disparities in New York City’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy, 10 ANNALS OF
APPLIED STAT. 365, 365–94 (2016) (discussing differences in Terry stop stop-and-frisk
behavior in New York City); see also Shanti P. Chakravarty, Economic Analysis of Police
Stops and Searches: A Critique, 18 EUR. J. POLIT. ECON. 597, 597–600 (2002).
75
See David Arnold, Will Dobbie, and Crystal S. Yang, Racial Bias in Bail Decisions,
133 Q.J. ECON. 1885, 1885–1932 (2018).
76
M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122
J. POL. ECON. 1320, 1320–54 (2014).
77
Shamena Anwar, Patrick Bayer, & Randi Hjalmarsson, The Impact of Jury Race in
Criminal Trials, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1017, 1017–55 (2012).
78
David S. Abrams, Marianne Bertrand, & Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Judges Vary in
Their Treatment of Race?, 41 J. LEG. STUD. 347, 347–83 (2012).
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CONCLUSION
The lyrics of 99 Problems do not include lurid shootouts, 79 car
accidents, 80 or reckless behavior. 81 Instead, they feature something familiar,
and too often deadly, for a young Black motorist: a Terry stop encounter with
the police. 82 Recent research illustrates that such an encounter can be risky
business 83—one false move on either the motorist’s or officer’s part can be
deadly, 84even if you’re rolling like Chamillionaire and your whip’s squeaky
clean. 85 The Author’s hope is that songs like 99 Problems not only serve to
start conversations about the difficult topic of police interactions, but also to
educate listeners about criminal procedure and the reality that, as in the case
of Jay-Z’s protagonist, even if a traffic stop does not turn deadly, risk of
confrontation or worse is inexorably part of any contact between a young
Black man and the police.

79
“I grabbed my nine, all I heard were shells. . . . Jumped in my car, slammed on the gas.
. . . Police on the scene. You know what I mean” ROBERT MATTHEW VAN WINKLE, Ice Ice
Baby, on HOOKED (SBK Records 1990).
80
“I swerved left then I swerved right, she was still tailgating me too damn tight. To the
left lane I tried to switch then you saw my blinker, bitch.” WILLARD CARROLL SMITH JR. &
JEFFREY ALLEN TOWNES, You Saw My Blinker, on HOMEBASE (Jive RCA 1991).
81
THE BEASTIE BOYS, High Plains Drifter, on PAUL’S BOUTIQUE (Capitol 1989).
82
See JAMES TODD SMITH, Illegal Search, on MAMA SAID KNOCK YOU OUT (Def Jam
1990); see also THE PHARCYDE, Officer, on BIZARRE RIDE II (Delicious Vinyl 1992).
83
Roland G. Fryer, Jr., An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of Force
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22399, 2018), https://www.nber.org/
papers/w22399.pdf [https://perma.cc/RB3D-9ZZQ].
84
See Roland G. Fryer, An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of
Force, 127 J. POL. ECON. 1210 (2019).
85
Chamillionaire’s song, Ridin’, discusses the virtues of driving around Houston without
contraband. HAKEEM SERIKI, Ridin’, on THE SOUND OF REVENGE (Universal 2005).

